

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 18767 01 OF 05 171841Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 SAB-01 DHA-02

OES-03 OMB-01 AS-01 /096 W  
----- 047220

R 171826Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4445

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

AMCONSUL HAMBURG

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMCONSUL STUTTGART

USMISSION USBERLIN

CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 18767

CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG PASS POLAD: CINC EUR

VAIHINGEN PASS POLAD: CINC USAFE RANSTEIN PASS POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, GW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 18767 01 OF 05 171841Z

NOVEMBER 10-15

REF: BONN 18676 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: THE SCHEEL VISIT WENT WELL. IT WAS MARKED BY GOOD ATMOSPHERE, BUT CONTAINED LITTLE SUBSTANCE. THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY LINE (DETENTE) IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. GENSCHER'S CONSULTATIONS WITH GROMYKO WERE DEVOTED MAINLY TO DISCUSSION OF THREE PENDING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, WHERE SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE. IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE, SALT, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION WERE DISCUSSED. MBFR AND SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA WERE NOT. PODGORNYY PREDICTED LITTLE PROGRESS IN FRG/GDR NEGOTIATIONS SOON. BREZHNEV APPEARED TO BE HEALTHY, BUT HAD DIFFICULTY IN SPEAKING. ON THE WHOLE, THE FRG SEEMS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS. END SUMMARY.

1. THE AMBASSADOR SAW FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL NOVEMBER 15 FOR A BRIEFING ON SCHEEL'S VISIT TO THE USSR AND GENSCHER'S CONSULTATIONS WITH GROMYKO, WHICH WERE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.

2. CONCLUSIONS: THE MAJOR CONCLUSION THE GERMAN SIDE CAME AWAY WITH IS THAT THE DIE HAS BEEN CAST FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS. BOTH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO SAID THAT THE TWENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS WILL REAFFIRM THE PEACE PROGRAM OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, SPECIFICALLY THE POLICY OF DETENTE WITH WESTERN EUROPE. GROMYKO'S RECENT ARTICLE IN "KOMMUNIST" HAS SET THE FOREIGN POLICY LINE FOR THE CONGRESS AND IS BEING DISSEMINATED AND REPEATED WIDELY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE GERMAN SIDE WAS ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE EAGER TO MAINTAIN A GOOD CLIMATE IN USSR/FRG RELATIONS. THE SOVIET PRESS STRESSED THE THEMES OF THE LONG-TERM CHARACTER OF DETENTE AND THE VALUE OF THE MOSCOW TREATY. THE SOVIET LEADERS FOLLOWED THESE SAME THEMES IN THE PRIVATE TALKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 18767 01 OF 05 171841Z

4. BREZHNEV: BREZHNEV GREETED SCHEEL WITH OVERWHELMING FRIENDLINESS WHEN THEY MET NOVEMBER 11 FOR ONE HOUR, FORTY MINUTES. DURING THE TALK, HE JUMPED UP SEVERAL TIMES, MADE A POINT OF BEING VERY LIVELY, AND USED A LOT OF GESTURES FOR EMPHASIS IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT HE IS HEALTHY AND HAS GREAT VITALITY. HOWEVER, HIS DIFFICULTIES IN SPEAKING WERE EVIDENT.

5. BREZHNEV COMPLAINED THAT ALL GERMAN LEADERS BRING UP BERLIN WHEN THEY MEET WITH HIM. GROMYKO INTERJECTED THAT BERLIN KEEPS RISING UP LIKE A GHOST. BREZHNEV SAID THAT THE USSR REGARDS THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT AS A GOOD AGREEMENT AND VALID. THE USSR WILL NOT WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT OF IT. HE TOLD SCHEEL THAT EVEN IF THE FRG CLAIMS RIGHTS IN BERLIN, IT IS POWERLESS TO CHANGE THE EXISTING SITUATION. THE FRG HAS COMMITTED BOTH UNIMPORTANT AND IMPORTANT SINS AGAINST THE AGREEMENT. IT SHOULD NOT START FIGHTS OVER BERLIN, BUT RATHER SHOULD PURSUE A SOBER POLICY.

6. BREZHNEV SAID THAT DIFFERENCES IN THE GERMAN AND SOVIET SOCIAL SYSTEMS SOMETIMES PRODUCE PROBLEMS IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 18767 02 OF 05 171846Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 SAB-01 DHA-02

OES-03 OMB-01 AS-01 /096 W

----- 047265

R 171826Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4446

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG  
CINC EUR VAHINGEN  
CINC USAF RAMSTEIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 18767

ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS, BUT HE REMAINS AN OPTIMIST ABOUT THESE RELATIONS. HE CITED GERMAN DEMANDS FOR HIGH INTEREST AS AN ATTITUDE WHICH CAUSES POLITICAL PROBLEMS. BREZHNEV ALSO ASKED HOW LONG THE FRG WOULD PERMIT RFE, RL, AND DEMONSTRATIONS BEFORE THE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 18767 02 OF 05 171846Z

SOVIET EMBASSY TO CONTINUE. HE SAID THE FRG SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO CONTROL THESE FACTORS.

7. FRG TALKING POINTS: SCHEEL AND GENSCHER HAD AGREED BEFOREHAND THAT THEY BOTH WOULD DEFEND DETENTE AS AN ELEMENT IN GERMAN POLICY WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER ELEMENTS SUCH AS GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC, SUPPORT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, EFFORTS TO REACH UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND THE NEED FOR EVENTUAL GERMAN REUNIFICATION. GENSCHER AND SCHEEL POINTED OUT IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS THAT DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO DETENTE, AND THAT DETENTE SHOULD ALLOW A COMPETITION OF IDEAS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THEY ALSO STRESSED THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES IN GERMANY SUPPORT DETENTE AND THE MOSCOW TREATY. THE SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY WHEN SCHEEL AND GENSCHER SPOKE ALONG THESE LINES.

8. PODGORNYY/SCHEEL CONVERSATIONS: THESE TALKS WENT WELL. THEY WERE MAINLY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF THE LASTING VALUE OF DETENTE OVER THE LONG TERM. IN THIS CONNECTION, PODGORNYY UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOSCOW TREATY. PODGORNYY MADE THE SPECIFIC POINT THAT THE FRG SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY GREAT MOVEMENT IN ITS TALKS WITH THE GDR IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

9. GENSCHER/GROMYKO: IN CONTRAST WITH THE GENERAL TALKS PODGORNYY AND SCHEEL HELD, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSSED (AT GROMYKO'S INSISTENCE) THE THREE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS UNDER NEGOTIATION (CULTURAL

PROTOCOL, LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION). THESE DISCUSSIONS CONSUMED THE BETTER PART OF THREE DAYS, AND GENSCHER WAS, THEREFORE, NOT ABLE TO RAISE ALL THE MULTILATERAL ISSUES HE INTENDED.

10. CSCE: GENSCHER TOLD GROMYKO THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR CSCE MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED SO THAT PROGRESS WILL BE APPARENT BY THE TIME OF THE BELGRADE MEETING IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 18767 02 OF 05 171846Z

1977. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG HAS ALREADY STARTED IMPLEMENTATION. HE CITED CBM'S, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF MANEUVERS, AND THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. HOWEVER, BASKET III AND II SHOULD ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT NOW PEOPLE (READ FRENCH) WANT TO CONCLUDE ADDITIONAL TREATIES TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF CSCE. THIS, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, IS NOT NECESSARY. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG PRESENTLY GIVES SOVIET JOURNALISTS MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS AND ASKED FOR RECIPROCITY. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL, BUT WOULD NEED AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BEFORE IMPLEMENTING IT. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT NO EXCHANGE OF NOTES IS NEEDED. VAN WELL TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THE PROBLEM HERE, OF COURSE, IS THAT IF THERE IS AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES, THE FRG MUST INSIST ON A BERLIN CLAUSE AND THAT WOULD OPEN THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PRACTICAL EXTENSION OF THE RESULTS OF CSCE TO BERLIN. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IMPLEMENT CSCE IN TIME, BUT COMPLAINED THAT THE EC 9 IS PURSUING IMPLEMENTATION TOO ACTIVELY. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE EC 9 WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE ON CSCE.

11. THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION: GENSCHER SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. ITS RESULTS WERE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS AND ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO COOPERATE AND CONSULT. REALIZATION OF THE PROGRAM AND LESSENING OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE. FRIENDLY WORDS WERE NOT ENOUGH, SINCE A REAL TRANSFER OF RESOURCES TO THE THIRD WORLD IS NEEDED. THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES MUST OPEN THEIR MARKETS TO THE THIRD WORLD. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CLAIM THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD IMPORT MORE INDUSTRIALIZED OR PROCESSED PRODUCTS. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RICH AND POOR NATIONS ARE GREATER THAN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE USSR. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT CONSULTATIONS ON THIS QUESTION IN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 18767 03 OF 05 171851Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 SAB-01 DHA-02

OES-03 OMB-01 AS-01 /096 W  
----- 047331

R 171826Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4447

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

AMCONSUL HAMBURG

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMCONSUL STUTTGART

USMISSION USBERLIN

CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 18767

FUTURE WOULD BE GOOD. THE USSR IS NOT AS IMMEDIATELY  
AFFECTED BY WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS THE FRG, BUT  
NEITHER IS IT ISOLATED FROM THE WORLD ECONOMY AND/THERE-  
FORE, IS INTERESTED IN QSOLUTION OF WORLD ECONOMIC  
PROBLEMS. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT THE PROGRAM RESULTING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 18767 03 OF 05 171851Z

FROM THE SPECIAL SESSION CALLS FOR THE CREATION OF SEVENTEEN DIFFERENT BODIES. HE SAID THE PROGRAM INCORPORATES GOOD PRINCIPLES, BUT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN SOLUTIONS TO THE SERIOUS CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY THE THIRD WORLD.

12. SALT: GROMYKO TOLD GENSCHER THAT THERE ARE STILL PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO CRUISE MISSILES.

13. MIDDLE EAST: PODGORNYY RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH SCHEEL, BUT NEITHER HE NOR GROMYKO MADE A COHERENT PRESENTATION ON THIS SUBJECT. PODGORNYY WAS CRITICAL OF THE WEST'S APPROACH AND SAID THAT THE WEST DID NOT RESPECT LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. GENSCHER RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM. GROMYKO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ZIONISM AND ISRAEL, CLAIMING THE SOVIET UNION HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT THE USSR HAD NEITHER PROPOSED NOR ENCOURAGED THE ZIONISM RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THE CHAUVINISTIC CHARACTER OF ZIONISM.

14. THE THREE AGREEMENTS: VAN WELT CLAIMED THERE WAS VERY LITTLE MOVEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE THREE AGREEMENTS UNDER NEGOTIATION. WHILE THE SOVIETS MADE AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITIONS, AND WHILE GROMYKO PRESSED FOR EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS ON THE THREE AGREEMENTS, IT WAS OBVIOUS TO GENSCHER THAT THERE WAS NO POLITICAL PUSH ON THE SOVIET SIDE. GENSCHER DOES NOT WANT ANY DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF THESE AGREEMENTS AND IS DETERMINED TO WAIT FOR ACCEPTABLE SOVIET POSITIONS TO EMERGE.

15. LEGAL ASSISTANCE: THE SIGNING SCENARIO IS AGREED. THERE IS A PROBLEM OVER THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF THE TITLE. THE SOVIETS WERE EVASIVE WHEN GENSCHER ASKED HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD INFORM THE THREE POWERS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SENATE WANTS THIS NOTIFICATION TO BE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 18767 03 OF 05 171851Z

ONLY FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES WITH NO IMPLICATION THAT

IT HAD ANY CONSTITUTIVE EFFECT. THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD INFORM THE THREE POWERS BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE IN MOSCOW. THE FRG INSISTED THAT THE NOTIFICATION TAKE PLACE AT LEAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS SAID THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS POSITION. BONDARENKO WARNED VAN WELL THAT IF THE FRG INFORMED THE THREE POWERS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SIGNING, IT WOULD PRESENT SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. VAN WELL AGREED THAT HE WOULD ONLY INFORMALLY INFORM THE THREE POWERS. THE SOVIETS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT INFORM ANYONE ELSE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT EXCEPT THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. VAN WELL SAID THAT IF THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SENT NOTES TO THE THREE POWERS, THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG. THE SOVIETS SAID THAT THEY WOULD STUDY THIS QUESTION. GENSCHER IS DETERMINED TO PROCEED NO FURTHER IN THIS NEGOTIATION UNTIL HE SEES THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET NOTE, BUT VAN WELL EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE BEFOREHAND.

16. CULTURAL PROTOCOL: THERE ARE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO ACCEPT SEVERAL SPECIFIC EXCHANGES FROM BERLIN. WHEN SCHOEDEL WAS IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS TOLD HIM THEY WANTED TO CHANGE THE ORDER OF THE ARTICLES, PLACING THE BERLIN CLAUSE BEFORE THE CLAUSE THAT SAYS "DIRECT CONTACTS WITH BERLIN WILL BE PERMITTED, AS IN THE PAST". DURING THE MOSCOW VISIT, THE SOVIETS RETREATED ON THIS POINT. THE SOVIETS REJECTED GERMAN PROPOSAL TO USE "ALLE" IN A CLAUSE WHICH REFERS TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE GERMAN SOCIETY FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 18767 04 OF 05 171855Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15



USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 SAB-01 DHA-02

OES-03 OMB-01 AS-01 /096 W

----- 047360

R 171826Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4448

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

AMCONSUL HAMBURG

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMCONSUL STUTTGART

USMISSION USBERLIN

CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 18767

RESEARCH (ALLE MITGLIEDER). THE SOVIETS ARE NOW  
STUDYING A GERMAN PROPOSAL TO SUBSTITUTE "DIE" FOR  
"ALLE." THE GERMAN SIDE INVITED THE SOVIETS TO BONN  
FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 18767 04 OF 05 171855Z

17. SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION: THE FRG  
GAVE THE SOVIETS A LIST OF FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS IN  
BERLIN AND ASKED HOW MANY OF THEM WOULD BE EXCLUDED AS  
SUCH AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE "PERSONAL SOLUTION."  
THE SOVIETS ARE STUDYING THIS LIST. THE FRG INSISTED  
THAT THE SENDING STATE DETERMIN THE QUALIFICATIONS OF  
EXPERTS. GROMYKO FINALLY ACCEPTED THIS POSITION WHEN  
IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE RECEIVING STATE  
RETAINS FINAL AUTHORITY ON WHOM IT WILL ACCEPT BY ITS  
POWER TO DENY VISAS. GENSCHER RAISED -- FOR THE FIRST  
TIME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS -- THE FRG INSISTENCE THAT  
ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT RELATING TO BERLIN DOES NOT  
AFFECT MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND FRG PARTICIPATION IN  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE SOVIETS WILL CONSIDER.

THE NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE A TALK BETWEEN VAN WELL AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR FALIN. GENSCHER IS DETERMINED TO GO SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY. VAN WELL REMAINS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

VAN WELL SAID THAT NEITHER THE ABSENCE OF A COMMUNIQUE NOR THE CANCELLATION OF MEETINGS BETWEEN SCHEEL AND PODGORNÝ AND GENSCHER AND GROMYKO ON NOVEMBER 13 WERE SIGNIFICANT. THE FRG DID NOT WANT A COMMUNIQUE. THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN ONLY TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED, AND PROVED TO BE UNNECESSARY. VAN WELL MET WITH BONDARENKO ON THE THIRTEENTH AND CLEARED UP ALL UNFINISHED BUSINESS.

18. COMMENT: THE FRG SEEMS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT. THE GERMAN DELEGATION OBTAINED REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AND GOOD FRG/USSR RELATIONS. THE SOVIETS DID NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA. SCHEEL MET WITH BREZHNEV, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE FIRST VISIT BY A GERMAN HEAD OF STATE TO THE USSR SINCE BEFORE WORLD WAR I (EXCEPT GDR VISITS) WENT OFF WITHOUT A HITCH AND WITH NONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT GISCARD EXPERIENCED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 18767 05 OF 05 171856Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 SAB-01 DHA-02

OES-03 OMB-01 AS-01 /096 W

----- 047372

R 171826Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4449

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMCONSUL BREMEN  
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG  
CINC EUR VAIHINGEN  
CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 18767

VAN WELL IDENTIFIED STATE SECRETARY FRANK AS THE  
SOURCE OF THE STORIES WHICH APPEARED IN THE GERMAN PRESS  
(REPORTED REFTEL) THAT BREZHNEV APPEARED TO BE AS  
HEALTHY AS HE WAS WHEN HE VISITED THE FRG TWO YEARS AGO.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 18767 05 OF 05 171856Z

FRANK HAD EXTENSIVE EXPOSURE TO BREZHNEV ON THAT  
OCCASION, AND, VAN WELL OBSERVED-HIS COMMENTS HAVE A  
SOLID BASIS.

WHILE VAN WELL CLAIMED THAT LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON  
THE THREE PENDING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, IT APPEARS TO  
THE EMBASSY THAT THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY  
ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE.

VAN WELL REMAINS SKEPTICAL, HOWEVER, ABOUT EARLY  
CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENTS, ESPECIALLY SCIENTIFIC/  
TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION, IN LIGHT OF HIS EARLIER  
EXPERIENCES WITH THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EMBASSY AGREES  
WITH THIS ASSESSMENT GIVEN GENSCHER'S OBVIOUS  
DETERMINATION TO AVOID DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY OVER THESE  
AGREEMENTS AS THE GOVERNMENT PREPARES FOR NEXT YEAR'S  
ELECTIONS.  
HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DETENTE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PARTY MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 17 NOV 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BONN18767  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750400-0066  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751138/aaaabhho.tel  
**Line Count:** 596  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 11  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 BONN 18676  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <08 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** WALTER SCHEEL'S VISITS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, UR, GE, (SCHEEL, WALTER), (GENSCHER, HANS DIETRICH)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006